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Since courts created under Article III of the constitution have jurisdiction to hear only (certain categories of) "cases" and "controversies," it was inevitable that these limits would spawn technical requirements for litigant standing. Some argue that the rigid elements of standing doctrine are imposed merely to keep out of court those types of cases (often civil rights cases) that the Justices do not want to hear. Others claim that the rules of standing serve to assure that the judicial power is exercised only when absolutely necessary, thus avoiding interjecting federal courts into political and social controversy.
Each of the 4 elements of standing (injury in fact, causation, redressability, and personal rights) is somewhat fluid, thereby allowing some manipulation. Whether a plaintiff satisfied the elements can depend on how the court views the injuries alleged and remedies sought.
Standing vs. Merits
It is tempting, but dangerous, to look too far into the merits of a case when determining if the parties have standing. For instance, in Warth v. Seldin, don't confuse plaintiffs' alleged injury (exclusion from Penfield, denial of integrated community, tax burden, or denial of building permits) with their cause of action under the equal protection clause. It may be that exclusionary zoning is simply wealth discrimination (which is legal), rather than racial discrimination (which is illegal), but that's an issue for merits determination, not jurisdiction. To make the standing question clearer in Warth, assume that the town had a law forbidding non-whites from living there. Now examine the plaintiffs' injury. Do any of them have standing?
There's a slight problem here. On the one, hand I'm urging you to divorce the justiciability and merits questions; while on the other, I concede that courts often decide the former with one eye on the latter. Moreover, it is often necessary to look at the claims and the relief sought to determine if standing exists; but when doing so, a court should presume that plaintiff would win on her claims.
Manipulating Standing
Now compare Warth to some of the note cases in the book. it is true that a least common denominator rule of law can be discerned that reconciles the results in these cases. Yet, it's also possible to distinguish the cases based on ideology/politics. What do you think?
Having 2 sets of parallel courts can be confusing. First, there are questions of overlapping and contradictory jurisdiction. Next, we have to confront issues of tranfer between the two systems. Finally, we must reconcile the U.S. Supreme Court's role in reviewing both systems for constitutional error. This post covers the basics.
Concurrent and Exclusive Jurisdiction
The general rule is that state courts of competent jurisdiction must hear federal claims and defenses, to the same extent they would hear analagous state issues. Some federal causes of action can only be heard in federal court. There's no constitutional requirement of that, but in creating causes of action, Congress sometimes specifies exclusive jurisdiction in federal court (e.g., antitrust, patent, federal crimes).
There isn't perfect symmetry when it comes to federal courts hearing state claims and defenses, since federal jurisdiction is limited (whereas state court jurisdiction is general). Still, there are many instances, both under Diversity and Federal Question, where federal courts hear state claims.
Transfer
The general rule is that cases must remain in the sytem where they originate. However, there are many exceptions, including removal from state to US District Court (still an original cause when in District Court); remand from federal to state court (either upon removal or in some cases of supplemental jursidiction); and abstention. This latter doctrine covers those instances when a federal court defers to a state court for adjudication of some disputes, even when properly filed in federal court.
Review by the Supreme Court
The Supreme Court performs two basic functions on appeal: 1) to correct errors of law; and 2) to superintend the lower federal courts. The latter function has administrative dimensions; the S.Ct. is, after all, at the head of the federal judiciary. In this capacity, the Court can (but seldom does) hear state claims (sometimes for civil procedure reasons).
28 USC Section 1254 gives the S.Ct. jurisdiction to review decisions of lower federal courts. Section 1257 provides similar jurisdiction over appeals from state court. The "federalism" implications of this review have been settled since the early 19th century (Martin v. Hunter's Lessee; Cohens v. Virginia). But another federalism and justiciability principle has emerged that may preclude the Court from hearing state appeals.
The S.Ct. does not have 1257 jurisdiction to review questions of state law. Moreover, where a state claim (or defense) fully disposes of a case, the S.Ct. may not even have jursidiction to review federal claims in that case. That's because of the prohibition on issuing advisory opinions. If all the Court would do is correct a state court's mistatement of federal law, but not change the outcome of a case, then, in essence, the Court is issuing an advisory opinion.
The Adequate and Independent State Grounds Doctrine prevents review of federal claims where the same case contains state claims (or defenses) that are both adequate (fully resolves the dispute) and independent (state law not dependent upon federal court interpretations of federal law). In Michigan v. Long, the S.Ct. added a 3rd element to this doctrine; namely that the state court must clearly state that it's interpretation of state law is independent of federal law.
Thus, whenever the respondent (in the S.Ct.) has prevailed on an issue of state law, that is A&I, the S.Ct. lacks jurisdiction to review federal claims (no matter how they were decided below).
See, isn't this a lot more fun than, say, free speech?
The judicial power is conferred and defined in Article III. It is limited to 9 subject matter areas (diversity, federal question, etc). It is further limited to "cases and controversies." These are technical terms that give rise to the "justiciability" doctrines. If a case is not "justiciable," it is not within a federal courts' jursidiction; hence the court has no power to hear or adjudicate it. As with other terms of the constitution, "cases and controversies" is itself subject to interpretation. Interpretation is as much an ideological exercise as a judicial one. Hence, courts can manipulate "justiciability" to expand or contract federal jursidiction. As we will learn in the weeks to come, this can be done to close the courthouse door to unsympathetic cases.
Congress Responds
Another feature of Art. III we've been looking at is the control congress has over federal jurisdiction. While congress is given power (both by Art. I and Art. III) to create inferior courts, and to regulate S.Ct. appellate jurisdiction, other constitutional principles may limit congress' power. As a general rule, a goverment entity may not exercise the power it has in such a way as to violate constitutional rights or constitutional structure. When congress deprives the federal courts of jurisdiction, it may be preventing the courts from exercising their core constitutional functions. This would violate Separation of Powers.
Consider whether politically-charged "court stripping" measures, such as the misnamed "Constitution Restoration Act," or the hasty effort to direct the outcome of the Terri Schiavo case last year, are violations of Separation of Powers. Many think they are; and in the case of the Schiavo Act, the 11th Circuit found Congress' shenanigans unconstitutional.
Is there any way to avoid this tension between the federal courts and the political branches? Or is it a healthy reaffirmation of democracy?
Why does the Consitution need interpreting? Why does the Supreme Court get to do that? How do they do it? When do they do it? Marbury answers the first 2 "big" questions; the others will take a little more explaining.
The Constitution is our fundamental law. It not only creates and organizes the central government; it imposes limits on that government (and other governments too). Because it constrains the actions of people and institutions, it is law. As with any other law, it must be given specific meaning. This in turn requires that it be interpreted. And since it is the "supreme" law, it controls in the case of conflict with any law of lesser dignity (such as ordinary legislation).
In Case of Conflict ...
One can envision situations of unmistakable conflict, such as the election of a 30-yr old president, or Congress recognizing a new State formed from the territory of another. But conflicts between the Constitution and legislation can often be avoided through artful interpretations of one or the other (or both). Should potential conflicts be avoided, so as to give maximum efffect to both instruments?
Next Question: Why does the Supreme Court get to be the final interpreter of the Constitution? Why not have each branch of our tripartite co-equal government interpret the Constitution for itself? Is there a benefit to having an unelected and unremovable body (i.e., a non-"political" branch) sit in final judgment? Does this avoid electoral mischief or the tyranny of the majority? Or is the answer less philosophical than that. Perhaps the S.Ct. gets this job simply because that is the business of deciding cases. Maybe it is implicit in the concept of "judicial power" (which is given to the judiciary and not to the other branches).
When and how does the Court interpret the Constitution? To find the answer to that question, you need go no further than the current Senate Judiciary Commitee hearings on the nomination of Samuel Alito. How the text is interpreted depends almost entirely on a judge's legal philosophy (jurisprudence). We may be on the verge of a radical transformation on that score.
I hope you appreciate that I'm not answering these questions; just asking them. I'm relying on your comments for the answers.
The whole country is watching (or should be) the confirmation hearing of Judge Samuel Alito. And we now know why. The nine members of the Supreme Court have unparalleled power to interpret and enforce the constitution (the "supreme law of the land") against the other branches of government (both state and federal). Is this the way it should be? Should an unelected, unaccountable, and (mostly) unremovable judiciary be able to impose its will (or at least its judgment) on the rest of us? How does this reconcile with the notion of constitutional democracy?
For fuller coverage of the Alito hearing, check out these sources from the New York Times [link]. You may need to register (free) for online access.
This web log (or "blog") will serve as an online exchange for questions and commentary about topics we cover in this course. You should consult it often, at least after each class, to see what's posted. Also, feel free to add your own comments, either by name or anonymously. Other news, materials, and official notices, can be found on the class web site. Click menu link (on left) to go there.